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Abstract
The most common personal mobile device is the mobile phone. The modern
smart phone is much more than just a mobile phone; it is a personal computer
potentially managing sensitive data. Such data is used in interaction with
other devices and users. To achieve privacy the user and the software
developer can choose several approaches. We will in this paper discuss the
role of NFC, UICC and secure elements when developing applications where
privacy is a concern.
1 Introduction
Authentication and encryption are in many applications a necessary “extra functional”
feature used to provide security or privacy. For applications that involve monetary
transactions they are prerequisites if the application is to be perceived as secure. For
applications that handles user information or user context they are enablers to preserve
the users privacy. Mobile phones are today used to host a plethora of useful applications
that provide a diverse range of services to their owners. Being able to secure transactions
performed by these applications is crucial.
This paper describes new contactless communication technologies that are available
on smart phones today that are, or will be, used in transactions that needs to be secured
for privacy or security reasons. We have experimented with these technologies and have
designed and demonstrated several services that are useful and in need of security. The
services we have deployed in our multi-trial include payment, ticketing and context aware
services.
This paper was presented at the NISK-2014 conference.
2 NFC
Near Field Communication (NFC) [17] is a short-range communication technology with
some interesting features. The obvious one is its short range. This is intentional
and it contributes to security and the accuracy of proximity sensing. Another one is
intuitive usage. Users initiate NFC communication by (almost) touching NFC devices
or NFC tags with an NFC device. NFC also supports encryption [12, 4] and secure
communication [10].
NFC has a maximum bandwidth of 424Kbit/s and its range is typical less than 10 cm.
The NFC Forum [13] has defined three different NFC operation modes; Card Emulation,
Reader/Writer and Peer-to-Peer [17]. In card emulation mode, the NFC device acts as
(and eliminates the needs for) a physical object, such as a credit card, key, ticket or
coupon. In reader/writer mode, NFC devices can read and write data from/to NFC tags,
while in peer-to-peer mode, data can be transferred between two NFC devices. NFC
can be used for payments, tickets and loyalty cards; to discover, synchronize and share
information; and to configuration and setup. More details on NFC and how it contributes
to user-friendliness are presented in [2].
NFC involves an initiator and a target. The initiator actively generates an RF field that
can power a passive target. This enables NFC targets to take very simple form factors
such as tags, stickers, key fobs, or cards that do not require batteries. NFC peer-to-peer
communication, where both devices are powered, is also possible. However, the limited
bandwidth makes it inferior to Bluetooth for big data transfers.
NFC tags contain data, and may be configured to be both read-only and rewritable.
They can be custom-encoded by their manufacturers or use the specifications provided by
the NFC Forum, including the tag format for the tag header and the data format for the
payload. The NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) specification [14] defines a message
encapsulation format to exchange information (payload) between NFC Forum Devices
and NFC Forum Tags [16]. Each payload is described by a type, a length, and an optional
identifier. The type identifiers may be URIs, MIME media types, or NFC-specific types.
The type identifier can be used by NFC enabled devices to perform the correct action
when an NFC tag is touched. On the mobile phone the correct application matching the
MIME media type of the tag can be opened to process the information on the tag. You can
configure the mobile phone to open a given application based on this type information.
This means that when you use the phone to touch a tag you do not have to open any
application before you do that. Touch the tag and the correct application handles the
interaction automatically. This makes the usage of NFC user-friendlier than QR codes
and similar approaches.
NFC technology becomes even more exciting when it interacts with the UICC (SIM
card) on a mobile phone. The UICC can act as a tamper-resistant secure element,
securely hosting applications and their confidential data. The Single Wire Protocol (SWP)
[9] enables direct communication between the UICC and the NFC chip on a phone.
Applications on the UICC can then directly interact over NFC without involving any
part of the mobile phone operating system (even when the phone is turned off). This is
important for applications like ticketing.
3 UICC
Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC, also known as SIM card) is basically tiny
computers with CPU, memory, I/O system and a file system. They are affordable (ranging
from a few cents to a couple of dollars depending on the configuration), tamper resistant
and secure. The UICC has proven itself to be robust against attacks and is well suited
to hosting sensitive applications and data. This includes a secure element that provides
a secure environment for both programs and data [1, 21]. Java Card versions with
a GlobalPlatform conformant Secure Element can facilitate isolation between Security
Domains (SDs) and allows for loading and installation of applets (programs) to these
security domains. This provides a highly interesting architecture for secure applications,
but unfortunately many MNOs (Mobile Network Operators) have in very little degree
harvested on this opportunity.
The SIM card is a fundamental part of the value chain and market offering for all
(GSM-based) MNOs across the world. The SIM card has since Giesecke & Devrient
sold the first 300 cards to Radiolinja in 1991 [3] been the entity that securely identifies
the mobile subscription as a basis for mobile operators for charging and billing their
subscribers. The evolution of the SIM has not happened in a structured way or been
controlled by one player or organization. However, the GSM standards for mobile
networks as specified by ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute)
requires authentication of a mobile subscriber through a secure device (the SIM card).
In this respect, the SIM card has always performed the following valuable functions:
• Identification of a subscriber: The IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity)
stored on the SIM card, is the identity of a subscriber. Each IMSI is one of the
primary keys used to look up the subscriber in the Home Location Register (HLR)
and thereby allowing a subscriber to be identified.
• Authentication of a subscriber: Using the authentication algorithm (e.g. Milenage
for 3G) on the SIM card, a unique response is provided by each subscriber based
on IMSI, an authentication key (Ki stored on SIM) and RAND (a random number
provided by network). This is used by the network to authenticate the subscriber
and thereby granting access to the network.
The SIM card was from the beginning a removable card and today we see SIM
functionality on removable Universal Integrated Circuit Cards (UICC) in several physical
form factors (e.g. 1FF, 2FF, and 3FF). On modern UICCs the basic SIM functionality
(identification and authentication) is merely one of several applications running on
the UICC operating system. The dominant operating system is the Java Card Open
Platform (JCOP), which is compliant with both the Java Card Specifications [23] and
the GlobalPlatform specifications [7].
4 The Secure Element
Several important standards have emerged that have enabled our work on how to utilize
the Secure Element in a more customer-centric manner. The existence of a manageable
Secure Element is described in the GlobalPlatform card specification [7]. It defines
the functionality and security mechanisms for security domains and management of
applets on a Secure Element. ISO/IEC 7816-4 [11] defines the format of the Application
Protocol Data Units (APDU) commands that can be used to communicate with the
GlobalPlatform Card Manager and thereby enables communication with applications on
the Secure Element. The SIM Alliance Open Mobile API [22] specifies how mobile
phone applications may access Secure Elements in a mobile device and allows mobile
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Figure 1: Mobile phone infrastructure with UICC, NFC, APDU, SWP and a Security
Domain (SD) on the UICC.
phone applications to send and receive APDU commands to the Secure Element (e.g. the
GlobalPlaform compliant Secure Element on the UICC).
Other important standards are the standards related to Near Field Communication
(NFC) [15] and the Single Wire Protocol (SWP) [5] that together allows applets on the
UICC to communicate with the Contactless Front End (CLF) and thereby facilitating
the existence of (secure) NFC applications as GlobalPlatform UICC applets. Figure 1
illustrates the SWP in the mobile phone infrastructure.
The SIMAlliance have provided a specification for communication between Android
applications and the Secure Element [22] but the open source implementation of this
specification has not found its way to the default distribution of Android. Google
have instead introduced Hosted Card Emulation (HCE) in its latest version of Android
(KitKat)1 that enables direct contact with the NFC contactless frontend from Android
applications. HCE together with a hosted Secure Element in the cloud or in conjunction
with a “secure enough” element in a Trusted Execution Environment [8] will be a head
on competitor to Secure Elements on the SIM (UICC) for many types of applications.
Urien and Piramuthu [24] have introduced the idea of a cloud of Secure Elements
where applications are stored in secure elements located in the cloud, and the smartphone
is used as a secure NFC bridge between a NFC reader (or a NFC initiator) and the remote
Secure Elements. The NFC proxy is secured by a SIM, or any component including a
Secure Element (SD memory, NFC-Controller). Their experiments have shown that this
could be a viable solution even for applications with stringent timing demands.
Pourghomi and Ghinea [20] consider different positions of a secure element within
the NFC architecture and discuss possible benefits from a cloud-based approach including
delivery of personalized content to each user.
1http://developer.android.com/about/versions/kitkat.html
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Figure 2: Mobile phone infrastructure with TSM and OTA.
5 Trusted Service Managers
From a functional point of view the Trusted Service Manager (TSM) allows service
providers to have their applications (i.e. applets) installed and managed on the Secure
Element over the air (OTA). The trusted service manager is a well-defined role in NFC
ecosystems [6] but can naturally also be used to install non-NFC services on Secure
Elements in mobile phones.
A TSM handles the Secure Element on the UICC with one of the available telecom
oriented Over The Air (OTA) channels available. Such channels usually use the Short
Messaging Service (SMS) or the Bearer Independent Protocol (BIP) with usage of the
handsets broadband modem’s data connection for transport of the UICC Application
Protocol Data Unit (APDU) commands necessary to manage the UICC properly. Figure
2 illustrates an UICC managed by a TSM over OTA.
We have designed and implemented a TSM (SecurePlay) that does not use a
telecom OTA channel for communication. Being a prototype, SecurePlay is limited
in functionality but supports the loading, installing and deletion of applets in the
Secure Element on the UICC. The supported functionality is fully compliant with the
GlobalPlatform specification [7]. It uses a proxy running on the Android OS in order to
take full advantage of the handsets broadband connection (e.g 3G, 4G or WiFi) instead of
a limited OTA channel. The proxy merely forwards encrypted application programming
units between the TSM and the UICC.
The implementation of the SecurePlay proxy has been done on Samsung Android
handsets (e.g. S3, Note 2 or S4). These handsets supports the SIM Alliance Open Mobile
API out of the box and no additional installation of SEEK (Secure Element Evaluation
Kit) for Android2 is required. We have successfully used the SecurePlay approach on
Scorpius and Cygnus UICC from Giesecke & Devrient where the Access Rule File (ARF)
has, for practical reasons, been configured to “allow all”, meaning that no additional
2https://code.google.com/p/seek-for-android/
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Figure 3: SecurePlay ecosystem overview.
certificate checking is performed before a mobile phone application is allowed to talk (i.e.
send APDU commands) to Java Card Open Platform conformant applets in the Secure
Element. It is of course still necessary to authenticate with the card manager in order to
set up a secure channel. Figure 3 gives an overview of how SecurePlay can be included
in a TSM ecosystem with service providers and Mobile Network Operators (MNO).
6 Cipurse
For many applications (e.g. loyalty cards, coupons, access keys, etc.) the only thing you
actually need on the SIM card is a byte blob or record file storage in addition to security
and safety mechanisms (i.e. authentication, message encryption and tearing handling).
Instead of creating application specific applets on the UICC it is in many cases a better
solution to use a generic secure storage on the UICC. The Open Standard for Public
Transport (OSPT) Alliance3 Cipurse standard [18] is a perfect match for these cases
and the only service specific functionality that needs to be handled by the TSM is the
personalization and/or provisioning of the Cipurse content. Using the OpenMobile API it
is also possible to allow applications on the mobile phone to read the content of the secure
storage. This is useful in order to be able to create feature rich graphical user interfaces on
the mobile phone related to the service oriented secure information in the Cipurse applet.
Updating the information on the Cipurse applet can also be done in this manner but in
order to keep the update/write keys secure it is perhaps better to let the TSM initialize
such updates.
As part of our work we have implemented a GlobalPlatform applet that conforms with
the OSPT Cipurse S specification. The Cipurse S applet has successfully been installed on
UICCs and we have verified that the installed Cipurse S applet functions according to the
specification after the installation using the TSM. Due to the relatively heavy computation
related to the cryptographical protocol required as part of the Cipurse authentication and
3http://www.osptalliance.org
encryption mechanism the validation time for the current implementation is too slow
for practical use (around 1.2s). This will change if UICC vendors include a native
implementation of the Cipurse Cryptographic API [18] on the UICC.
We have ported our Cipurse S UICC implementation to a Host Card Version (HCE)
and since the CPU on the mobile phone is a lot more powerful than the CPU on the UICC
the validation time for a ticketing product (provided by Fara), stored in the HCE version
of Cipurse S, has been measured to under 0.5s. This shows that HCE can be useful related
to performance. Note however that the keys used by the Cipurse cryptographical protocol
in the HCE version is vulnerable for attack since they are no longer stored in a secure
element.
7 Host Card Emulation
With the KitKat 4.4 version of the Android operating system, Google introduced Host
Card Emulation (HCE). In previous versions of the Android OS, all card emulation NFC
communication was directly routed to the Secure Element on the UICC. HCE is basically
the introduction of an alternative route for card emulation NFC communication, namely
directly to an Android application. This means that NFC card emulation communication
can be initiated and controlled by an Android application on the mobile phone in addition
to being controlled by an applet running in the secure element. One upside of this is
that it allows NFC applications to run on the powerful mobile phone as opposed to on
the resource constrained UICC. Another upside of this is that it enables the development
of NFC applications for the massive amount of Android application developers. The
downside is that it will not easily support development of secure NFC applications.
Security is not anymore by design but needs to be added as an add-on possibly using an
embedded secure element; a cloud based secure element or different variants of temporary
security tokens.
8 Discussions
A secure element on the mobile phone is an attractive asset as it makes it possible to
provide security mechanisms that enable applications on the mobile phone to perform
secured transactions. In mature markets, mobile phone operators deploy UICC’s that
include such a secure element but their position is under attack by other actors. The battle
started as a battle over the secure element where both Google and Apple include their own
embedded secure element in their own range of mobile phone handsets. It has escalated
to a platform battle with Google’s inclusion of Host Card Emulation (HCE) and Apple’s
introduction of NFC in their latest handset models.
The two variants of contactless communication, NFC from the secure element and
NFC using HCE, both enable application providers to support many of the same use cases.
They can both be used to provide payment services, ticketing services, and personalized
and context aware services. A challenge for NFC with HCE is solving the security issues.
This includes answering questions related to “what is secure enough?” and “Who is to
trust”.
9 Conclusions
The UICC or other secure elements might play an important role in providing security
and privacy in conjunction with applications on the modern smart phones. They provide
a way to securely store encryption keys and other sensitive data on the device. The Single
Wire Protocol is a way for applets (programs) on the UICC to communicate directly over
NFC with an NFC tag or an NFC terminal. This direct communication is protected from
being intercepted by code running on the host OS on the device. NFC using HCE does
not, by design, provide similar mechanism today.
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